My Natural Progression from Libertarian Theist to Quaker

Audio Article of
My Natural Progression from Libertarian Theist to Quaker
by Ben Stone

Featured in this episode:

  • The common origin of Quakers and libertarians
  • Some brief discussion of history
  • A list of things Quakers are not
  • A list of things libertarians are not
  • What it means to be a libertarian
  • What it means to be a Quaker

My Natural Progression from Libertarian Theist to Quaker

Posted in Audio Articles, Bad Quaker Theology, History, Property, Voluntaryism and the Zero Aggression Principle | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on My Natural Progression from Libertarian Theist to Quaker

Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?

Administrative Note from Bad Quaker Dot Com:
Due to some comments on a recent podcast contradicting the position held by Roderick Long on the subject of voting, it is with great pleasure that we at Bad Quaker Dot Com honor the brilliant mind of one of the leading thinkers in the liberty movement by blatantly stealing this article from him.
So then, from 2002…

 

Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?
by Roderick T. Long

Can the experience of Icelandic Vikings eight centuries ago teach us a lesson about the dangers of privatization? Jared Diamond thinks so. In his article “Living on the Moon,” published in the May 23, 2002, issue of the New York Review of Books, Diamond portrays the history of Iceland in the Viking period as a nightmarish vision of privatization run amuck.

Libertarian scholars and free-market enthusiasts have often pointed to the Icelandic Free State (930-1262) as a positive example of a society that functioned successfully with little or no government control. Writing in the Journal of Legal Studies, economist David Friedman observes that the Free State “might almost have been invented by a mad economist to test the lengths to which market systems could supplant government in its most fundamental functions.” As Diamond himself notes:

“Medieval Iceland had no bureaucrats, no taxes, no police, and no army. … Of the normal functions of governments elsewhere, some did not exist in Iceland, and others were privatized, including fire-fighting, criminal prosecutions and executions, and care of the poor.”

But unlike those who see who see the Icelandic system as a model to emulate, Diamond charges that the Free State’s excessively privatized character made it radically unstable, ultimately leading to the system’s violent collapse in 1262; his essay has already been cited by The American Prospect as a crucial resource for those “making the case against privatization and shrinking government.” So who’s right? Does medieval Iceland illustrate privatization’s benefits, or its hazards?

Lying in the North Atlantic between Norway and Greenland, its northern shores brushing the Arctic Circle, Iceland is a stark and desolate landscape of basalt and frozen lava, punctuated by volcanoes, geysers, and glaciers – eerily beautiful for tourists, though a wearying challenge for farmers. Such a harsh natural environment might have attracted few immigrants, were it not for a still harsher political climate back on the mainland. Iceland’s first settlers – Norse and Celto-Norse refugees from King Harald Fairhair’s attempt in the late ninth century to impose centralized control and property taxes on all of Norway – established what historians call the Icelandic Free State, or Icelandic Commonwealth, around the year 930. In Diamond’s words, “they privatized government beyond Ronald Reagan’s wildest dreams” (since Reagan dramatically increased the size and expense of government over the course of his administration, this is quite an understatement), “and thereby collapsed in a civil war that cost them their independence.”

This “thereby” is somewhat misleading, however, since civil strife did not become a serious problem in Iceland until around 1220, nearly three centuries after the system was established – and the system’s final collapse did not come until 42 years after that. As I have written elsewhere: “We should be cautious in labeling as a failure a political experiment that flourished longer than the United States has even existed.” Indeed, given Diamond’s criterion of instability, the United States cannot be called stable until it survives the year 2108. (Though one could argue that it has already failed the test: the United States had to wait only 85 years from its founding before plunging into a catastrophic civil war, by contrast with Iceland’s 290 years.)

How did the Icelandic Free State work? The 11th-century historian Adam von Bremen described Iceland as having “no king but the law.” The legal system’s administration, insofar as it had one, lay in the hands of a parliament of about 40 officers whom historians call, however inadequately, “chieftains.” This parliament had no budget and no employees; it met only two weeks per year. In addition to their parliamentary role, chieftains were empowered in their own local districts to appoint judges and to keep the peace; this latter job was handled on an essentially fee-for-service basis. The enforcement of judicial decisions was largely a matter of self-help (hence Iceland’s reputation as a land of constant private feuding), but those who lacked the might to enforce their rights could sell their court-decreed claims for compensation to someone more powerful, usually a chieftain; hence even the poor and friendless could not be victimized with impunity.

The basis of a chieftain’s power within the political order was the power he already possessed outside it, in civil society. The office of chieftaincy was private property, and could be bought or sold; hence chieftaincies tended to track private wealth. But wealth alone was not enough. As economic historian Birgir Solvason notes in his masterful study of the period, “just buying the chieftainship was no guarantee of power”; the mere office by itself was “almost worthless” unless the chieftain could “convince some free-farmers to follow him.” Chieftains did not hold authority over territorially-defined districts, but competed for clients with other chieftains from the same geographical area.

A chieftain was politician, lawyer, and policeman rolled into one: he represented his clients in parliament, served as their advocate in arbitration, and offered them armed assistance in dispute resolution. If his customers were dissatisfied with the quality or price of these services, they could switch to a different chieftain without having to change their physical location; the relation between chieftain and client could be freely terminated by either party, so that signing up with a chieftain was rather like signing up for insurance or long-distance phone service today; legal jurisdictions were, in effect, “virtual” rather than physical.

The fact that the provision of “governmental” services was a competitive rather than a monopolistic enterprise was arguably one of the Free State’s greatest strengths; just as in any other market, the competitive discipline imposed by the fear of losing clients to rival service providers served as a check on inefficiency and abuse of power. Icelandic law owed its resilience and flexibility to this decoupling of authority from geography.

Diamond finds this competitive legal system unprecedented and bizarre: “Everywhere else in the world that I know of, competing chiefs ruled over mutually exclusive territories, within which everyone else had to be that chief’s follower.” He seems unaware that non-territorial jurisdiction has been a fairly common phenomenon throughout history; indeed, the prevalence of non-territorial jurisdiction in medieval Europe is often credited with explaining the “rise of the West.” It is certainly true, however, that the Free State pressed the principle of non-territorial jurisdiction farther than most.

While non-territorial jurisdiction has its admirers, Diamond is certainly not one of them. On the contrary, he condemns this “weird territorial system” as a “recipe for chaos”:

“Freedmen other than chiefs could choose their chief and switch alliances, regardless of which chief happened to reside nearby. A chief’s farm became surrounded by a mosaic of smaller farms, some of them occupied by his own followers, others by other chiefs’ followers. The resulting feuds fill The Sagas of Icelanders.”

Yet in Jesse Byock’s Viking Age Iceland, one of the books on which Diamond claims to be basing his analysis, we find precisely the opposite information: the “lack of geographically defined chieftaincies” meant that no group could claim “exclusive or long-time control over any one area”; as a result, there were “few territorial ‘refuge areas’” where “feuding parties lived protected … by a cluster of kin and friends.” This “made sustained feuding difficult,” creating increased incentives for compromise. In other words, the non-territorial nature of Iceland’s legal order served to decrease, not to increase, the violence of feud. (Diamond also asserts that Iceland’s lack of a strong central government left it “defenseless against attacks,” a charge he substantiates by recounting an incident from 1627 – at which time Iceland was under the “protection” of the Danish crown, and the Free State system Diamond is criticizing had been defunct for nearly four centuries!)

Reading the Icelandic Sagas initially gives the impression of unremitting violence – until one notices that most of the feuds they describe consist of low-casualty skirmishes at long intervals. Though often referred to as “Vikings,” Icelanders made their living for the most part through farming and trade, and violence was sporadic; thanks to the economic incentives provided by Iceland’s legal system, conflicts were settled in court more often than in combat. Like any good storyteller, the authors of the Sagas simply skipped over the long boring periods when nobody was killing anybody.

To keep Icelandic feud in perspective, one may contrast it with continental Europe, whose princes, blessed with “mutually exclusive territories,” launched massive wars. As Solvason points out, Icelandic society was “more peaceful and cooperative than its contemporaries”; in England and Norway, by contrast, “the period from about 800 to 1200 is a period of continuous struggle; high in both violence and killings.” Byock contrasts the prolonged and violent civil strife which attended Christianization in Norway with its relatively swift and peaceful Icelandic analogue. Icelanders treated the conflict between pagans and Christians as a feud, to be resolved like any other feud – by arbitration. The arbitrator decided in favor of Christianity, and that was that. (So imbued were the Icelanders with the norms of conflict resolution through arbitration that they dealt with haunted houses in the same way – trying the ghosts for trespassing, in the confident expectation that, if found guilty, a good Icelandic ghost would respect the verdict of the court and peacefully depart!) Even at the Free State’s worst, during the system’s catastrophic breakdown into intestine warfare in the 1200s, the body count was fairly low; as Friedman writes:

“During more than fifty years of what the Icelanders themselves perceived as intolerably violent civil war, leading to the collapse of the traditional system, the average number of people killed or executed each year appears, on a per capita basis, to be roughly equal to the current rate of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in the United States.”

Obviously the level of violence during the three centuries before the civil war must have been even lower.

Diamond is best known for his 1997 book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, which argues that history is determined primarily by geographical rather than cultural factors; he applies a similar analysis here, maintaining that the Icelanders’ radically decentralized political system was forced on them by Iceland’s scanty supply of natural resources, leaving them “too poor even to afford a government.” (Oh, for such poverty!) In short, the law of Iceland was not the product of its inhabitants’ own ideas and values, but was in effect selected for them by the nature of their physical environment.

But didn’t the Icelanders choose that environment because they were hostile to centralized power back home? And doesn’t the structure of their legal system reflect that very hostility? Diamond can hardly ignore these facts, but he minimizes their importance:

“Having emigrated to Iceland in order to be independent of the growing power of the Norwegian king, Icelanders wanted minimal government anyway, and that attitude let them make a virtue of the necessity imposed by their poverty.”

In other words, Icelandic cultural attitudes were causally irrelevant to the outcome; although the system the Icelanders ended up with was to their liking, they would have ended up with much the same system whether they liked it or not.

Diamond’s portrait of medieval Icelandic society as crippled by extreme poverty is not borne out by the evidence. In their supposedly hapless and half-starved condition, Icelanders created a rich literary tradition of Eddas and Sagas, developed a sophisticated legal code, and mounted voyages of exploration to North America – activities that would seem to indicate a higher degree of prosperity and leisure than Diamond suggests. Arguing that Icelanders were in fact relatively affluent, Solvason points to the steady improvement of economic conditions and increased production of export goods over the course of the Free State period.

Ship ownership was far rarer in Iceland than one might expect in an island community, particularly a “Viking” one; Diamond surmises that this is because Iceland was poor in timber (or quickly became so as settlers unsustainably exploited Iceland’s natural resources), so that “the original ships of the settlers could not be replaced by new ships.” He infers that Iceland, being “almost entirely without ocean-going ships of its own,” was left at the mercy of foreign navigators who “controlled and exploited Iceland’s trade.” But as Solvason points out, timber was regularly imported to Iceland for a variety of purposes, and could have been used for shipbuilding if ships had been wanted; Solvason concludes that Icelanders voluntarily chose to exploit their comparative advantage in ranching (among Iceland’s chief exports were meat and wool) and leave shipbuilding to others, presumably because they found this decision more profitable.

Diamond’s geography-is-destiny approach to history deserves our skepticism in any case. The world is full of bleak, inhospitable, resource-poor regions whose inhabitants scratch out a meager living; but how many such regions have left us a cultural legacy comparable to medieval Iceland’s? Diamond would do well to heed philosopher R. G. Collingwood’s dictum that history is ultimately determined not by nature, but by what human beings make of nature. By all evidence, Icelanders maintained their privatized political system, not because they were driven by poverty and necessity to do so (though Diamond apparently finds their system so uncongenial that he can conceive no other reason), but quite simply because it worked.

But if the Icelandic Free State was so successful, why did it eventually collapse? Clearly, the explanation lies in the growing centralization of wealth and power. As Diamond writes:

“Originally, soon after settlement, Iceland had about 4,500 independent farms, but by the thirteenth century 80 percent of Iceland’s farmland was owned by five families, and all the other formerly independent farmers had become tenants.”

These five families also managed to buy up most of the chieftaincies, enabling them to dominate the courts and parliament. The concentration of chieftaincies in fewer hands also meant an end to the existence of competing chieftains within the same territory; Iceland began to be fractured into regions, each operating as a local monopoly or mini-state. During the years 1220-1262, the resulting struggle for hegemony among these mini-states broke out into open conflict, a crisis that was finally resolved only when the Icelanders, exhausted by civil war, invited King Haakon of Norway to govern them, thus bringing the Free State period to a close.

To Diamond, this final decision illustrates the utter bankruptcy of the Icelandic system: “I cannot think of another historical case of an independent country that became so desperate that it turned itself over to another country.” Perhaps he should have tried harder; he might have remembered England in 1688, offering the crown to William of Orange after deposing the Stuarts – or, harking farther back, the many small states who responded to civil strife by calling in a Roman garrison, thus submitting de facto to Roman authority. Moreover, the very desperation of the move indicates how unaccustomed the Icelanders were to levels of violence that had long been commonplace on the mainland. In any case, the Icelanders presumably saw the Covenant of 1262-64, not as a surrender of national independence, but simply as yet another case of signing up with a new chieftain because their previous chieftains had proven unsatisfactory. This new chieftain, the Norwegian king, was farther away, and so perhaps less dangerous; certainly he was wealthier than any Icelandic chieftain, and so (they imagined) less tax-hungry. What they failed to recognize was the incentive implications of switching from a competitive system to a monopolistic one – though admittedly, their own system had lost much of its competitive character already. (War is not a form of competition; it is what arises when competition breaks down.)

The process of competitive chieftaincies turning into monopolistic mini-states is obviously a move toward less privatization, not more; and it was precisely when Iceland had become less privatized and more like mainland Europe – a collection of principalities vying for supremacy – that it collapsed into the kind of large-scale warfare that had raged across the rest of Europe for centuries. It seems rather unfair, then, to blame this catastrophe on privatization. Still, why didn’t Iceland’s privatized system of law prevent the increasing concentration of wealth and power in the first place? Was this failure symptomatic of an inherent flaw in the Icelandic system?

Typically, Diamond offers an environmental explanation for the increasing concentration of wealth: Iceland’s harsh climate. “In cold years the poorer farms culled or lost their livestock in the winter because of insufficient hay,” and so were “forced to become debtors who were dependent on others for survival.” The cogency of this explanation is doubtful. Wealthier farmers had more hay, but they presumably also had more livestock; hence they most likely did not have more hay per head of livestock. Since wealth was held predominantly in land and livestock, not in currency, it’s unclear why hard winters should be expected to have a less severe impact on wealthy farmers than on poor ones.

A more plausible explanation for the Free State’s decline points to the introduction of the tithe in 1096. Made possible by Iceland’s conversion to Christianity a century earlier, the tithe – to pay church officials and maintain church buildings – was Iceland’s first real tax. (Previous “taxes” generally turn out on closer inspection to be voluntary exchanges of fees for services.) Assessed at 1% of the payer’s property, it was also Iceland’s first graduated tax (earlier fees were one-size-fits-all), and so took in much more revenue. Most importantly, the tithe lacked a competitive element. Recall the non-territorial character of a chieftain’s jurisdiction: a chieftain’s temptations to self-aggrandizement were kept in check by the knowledge that if he acquired delusions of grandeur or charged too high a price for his services, his clients could abandon him for a rival. But the tithe was territorial; all those who lived in the vicinity of a particular church building had to pay for its upkeep, and were not at liberty to transfer their support elsewhere. The catch is that the portion of tithe revenue allocated to maintaining church buildings went not to the official church hierarchy but to the wealthy private owners (usually chieftains) of stadhir, “churchsteads,” i.e., plots of land on which churches had been built. The tithe was a property tax; but chieftaincies, though marketable commodities, were exempt – as were the churchsteads themselves, predominantly owned by chieftains. (The parliament that enacted the tithe law was of course composed entirely of chieftains.)

The tithe thus did more than just increase the income of the chieftains; it decoupled that income from accountability. Economic inequalities per se are not a serious threat to liberty so long as they operate in a genuine market context, where the way to gain and maintain wealth is to please one’s customers; before the introduction of the tithe, a chieftain who proved too power-hungry would alienate his customers and so suffer financial discipline. But chieftains who owned churchsteads now had a captive market, and so were freed from all competitive restraints on their accumulation of wealth and power. Through buying off or intimidating less wealthy chieftains, the top families were able to gain control of multiple chieftaincies. This gave them a lock on the parliament, enabling them to pass still further taxes; it also decreased competition among chieftains, allowing them to charge monopoly prices and drive their clients into a serf-like state of debt and dependence.

The Icelandic system did fall through an inherent flaw, then, but not the one Diamond imagines; the Free State failed, not through having too much privatization, but through having too little. The tithe, and particularly the portion allotted to churchstead maintenance, represented a monopolistic, non-competitive element in the system. The introduction of the tithe was in turn made possible by yet another non-competitive element: the establishment of an official state church which everyone was legally bound to support. Finally, buying up chieftaincies would have availed little if there had been free entry into the chieftaincy profession; instead, the number of chieftains was set by law, and the creation of new chieftaincies could be approved only by parliament – i.e., by the existing chieftains, who were naturally less than eager to encourage competitors. It is precisely those respects in which the Free State was least privatized and decentralized that led to its downfall – while its more privatized aspects delayed that downfall for three centuries.

Diamond pities the medieval Icelanders. We might do better to emulate them.

This Article As It Appeared In 2002

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Interview 1 Bad Quaker with “Jim”

Interview 1 Bad Quaker with “Jim”
Ben talks to “Jim” about his life and thoughts as an Army scout, a cop, a SWAT member and instructor, and as a independent private security provider.

Featured in this episode:

  • Jim discusses his background
  • Police work prior to and after 9/11
  • Jim goes overseas after 9/11 with BlackWater USA and other companies
  • The difference between mercenaries and private security
  • The right to defend yourself and “the way the world needs to go”
  • America can’t afford to police the world
  • Somalia and pirates, a private solution
  • The direction America is headed
  • The Second Amendment and trusting citizens
  • Term limits and government
  • Balanced budget, Social Security, and National Defense
  • Afghanistan, ten years later
  • Minimal/local government
  • SWAT, “good cops/bad cops”, federal funding, private policing

Original Intro/Exit music by Grenades?!

Interview 1 Bad Quaker with Jim

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The Devil You Know

The Devil You Know
by Ben Stone
(audio version at bottom of this page)

There is a way of thinking that has for some time now, disturbed me. Sometimes it’s expressed in the phrase; “Choose the lesser of evils.” However I find this statement easy to refute by simply asking why I must choose evil at all. It seems to me that if I willingly choose evil, to any degree, I am not only complacent to evil but I am committing an evil act. How can a person of clear conscience intentionally commit an evil act? And once the evil deed is done, isn’t attempting to justify it also evil in and of itself? Therefore in choosing the lesser of evils I have fallen into another old adage, “Two wrongs don’t make a right.”

Ah, but leave it to the smooth tongue of the Irish to say something completely unacceptable in a way that convinces you to accept it. And that would be, “Better to have the devil you know than the one you don’t.” Curiously, as best as I can tell, this old Irish phrase appeared around the time certain second-tier Irish leaders and land owners conspired to assist the Roundhead invasion of Ireland in return for special treatment and payments by one Oliver Cromwell. Perhaps that other saying, “Speak of the Devil and he’ll be before you.” has a degree of truth to it as well. Also the statement, “You get what’s coming to you.” has some merit.

So in justifying an invitation to the devil, one claims familiarity with said devil. Isn’t that an odd method of redemption? Let’s hop in the Way-Back Machine and try it in some statements:
It’s 1972!
“Yes, I invited Charles Manson to our dinner party because I know him much better than Elvis.”
Now let’s crank that dial back to 1938!
“Yes, I invited Adolph Hitler to the Bar Mitzvah because I know him so well and I’ve never met Rabbi Rosenthal.”
Doesn’t this work wonderfully?
It’s funny how if you just say the same thing in a different way it shines a whole new light on the subject. Let’s do one more.
It’s 442ad.
“Yes, I invited Attila, prince of the Huns, to the counting house to assist with the audit. After all, I have known Attila since he was a child and I have never met this General Arnegisclus.”
(Do I get my History Geek Card stamped for that last one?)

You can clearly see my point, but some level of concern always lingers when letting go of the familiar and grasping at the unknown. However Sun Tzu teaches us to always know our enemy. And knowing your enemy is done for the purpose of defeating your enemy, not submitting to him. So then we are left with no practical excuse for accepting evil. We must, if we are to walk our path in life blameless, become familiar with but refuse to choose evil. If evil is thrust upon us we must use wisdom in seeking a way to avoid or resist it, but we must never choose to accept it. However, this is only half an answer. If we can be convinced to resist the familiar evil we must know that which we are to grasp. So we look back to Sun Tzu and see that we are not only to know our enemy but we are to know our self. The way to become confident in rejecting evil is by better knowing ourselves.

The Bible describes the network of tents and ritual objects that the Levite priests used in the ceremonies involving the sacrifice of animals prior to entering the presence of the Ark of The Covenant. (That’s the Indiana Jones ark, not the flood ark.) Before they could enter the main tent, after having brought a lamb to the alter and having slaughtered it, they washed their hands, faces, and beards in a huge basin that had been made by pounding bronze into the shape of a bowl and then polishing it to a gleaming finish. The effect of this highly polished surface covered in water was to create a mirror the priests could look at as they washed to make sure they removed all traces of the lamb’s blood. You see, if you are familiar with the Indiana Jones movie, they didn’t want to enter the presence of the Ark with the stains of slaughter on their hands because it could have adverse health effects.

For us, this is an example of knowing our self. As we examine our self and become more familiar with that face in the mirror, it becomes easier to understand our friends and neighbors. As we remove the stains of slaughter from our own lives and get better acquainted with our own strengths and weaknesses, we can begin to see ourselves as others see us. The more we do this the easier it is to understand the choices and actions of others when we interact with them. And the better we know our friends and neighbors the better we can learn how and when to trust them. As we learn more and more about our self and others we see that people really are mostly the same. Sure we all have strengths and weaknesses, but most people are not much different than you and me. Most people want the best life possible and prefer that life to be as peaceful as possible.

Now the fear of the unknown can begin to fade away as you learn that your neighbor is not so different after all. You realize at some point in this process, that the guy down the street has no more desire to rob you than you do to rob him. That’s not to say that there are no robbers, it just means the average guy down the street is no more likely to be a robber than you are.
But what of the robber that does exist? Who can we trust to help us with him?
Well, if we know one, we could ask a bigger tougher robber to help us with the robber. Perhaps if we knew a big strong gang of robbers we could ask them to defend us from the robber. But then, why would a gang of thieves protect us from other thieves?
Well, we could pay the big powerful gang to protect us from small gangs and individual thieves.
That doesn’t make sense does it?
That would be like choosing one evil over another simply based on familiarity.
Like if it were better to have the devil you know than the one you don’t.

Ben StoneBen
2011

 

The Devil You Know (audio version)

Posted in Audio Articles, Bad Quaker Theology, Brief Articles and Short Notes, Free Society, History, The Campfire, Voluntaryism and Social Interactions | Tagged , , , , | Comments Off on The Devil You Know

A Natural View of Rights, Instinct, and Law

Audio Article of
A Natural View of Rights, Instinct, and Law
by Ben Stone

Featured in this episode:

  • Observations of common yard animals
  • Laws and rights unique to each species
  • The cat who kills the bird has not violated the bird’s rights
  • Species survival is based on obeying natural laws/rights
  • Discovering natural human laws, rights, and instincts
  • The marijuana law debate
  • Dealing with statists

A Natural View of Rights, Instinct, and Law

Posted in Audio Articles, Bad Quaker and Sin, Free Society, Property, Voluntaryism and Competitive Government, Voluntaryism and Law, Voluntaryism and Social Interactions, Voluntaryism and the Zero Aggression Principle | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on A Natural View of Rights, Instinct, and Law

Law without legislators

Law without legislators
by Jock Coats

Like nearly everyone else I have lived most of my life not thinking to question that we need a government in order to create and enforce the law, to preserve the peace and to guarantee contracts. Even as I watched, horrified, through a decade of frenzied legislative activity which sapped all my faith in political government it was difficult to see how we could really do without some legislators.

But it turns out that there has long been a school of thought that says we can have justice, peace and security without state legislators and the apparatus of enforcement and punishment over which they wield a monopoly. Not only that, but that there are reasons to believe it would:

  • produce better justice;
  • provide more responsive protection and efficient, cost effective resolution, both for victims and perpetrators;
  • when change is needed, when opinions alter about what is a crime, more swiftly incorporate such change into the law as practiced;
  • and adjudicate between and reconcile different systems of law, such as religious law.

All without legislators; without, in a word, a state.

Read More at JockCoats.me

Jock Coats,
Oxford, UK
From his web site:
“IT Support, Oxford Brookes University, where I have also been a Governor of the University and a Warden in a hall of residence.”

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Episode 7 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast

Episode 7 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast
With Ben and Ki

Featured in this episode:

Original Intro/Exit music by Grenades?!

Episode 7 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast

Posted in All Podcasts, Bad Quaker Theology, Free Society, Voluntaryism and Competitive Government, Voluntaryism and the Zero Aggression Principle | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Episode 7 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast

Medical Economics

Medical Economics
by Ben Stone

From January of this year to present, end of May 2011, two people I know very well have gone through medical screenings, tests, and a minor surgical procedure, none of which are considered “voluntary”. All parties involved had high quality medical insurance partly paid for by their employer, a well-respected international company. In each case the insurance carrier approved of every service provided by the medical professionals in advance. And yet at every stage along the way, the “price” the medical professionals charged for their services exceeded the amount the insurance provider would allow, leaving a balance the “patient” was left paying.

Before going further, let’s get some basic economic facts out of the way:

  1. If an insurance company doesn’t put a cap on the amount they’re willing to pay for a product/service it will quickly go out of business because there is nothing to keep the product/service provider from charging into infinity.
  2. If an insurance company doesn’t require the insured to pay some kind of co-pay or partial payment, it will slowly go out of business because there is no motive for the insured to conserve and use the product/services in moderation. The insured will be motivated to “get their money’s worth” and they will over use the product/service that the insurance company pays for.
  3. The insurance company is motivated to make as much profit as possible.
  4. The product/service provider (healthcare) is motivated to make as much profit as possible.
  5. The insured (the patient) is motivated to get the most/best product/service possible for the least money spent.
  6. The price the insurance company will charge for insurance will be the most it can get given the market in which it competes.
  7. The product/service provider will charge the insurance company as much as the insurance company is willing to pay.
  8. Above and beyond what the insurance company will pay, the product/service provider will charge the insured/patient as much as the insured/patient is willing to pay.
  9. The portion of the insurance that the employer pays on behalf of the insured/patient is simply wages the employer would pay either way.
  10. Ultimately, 100% of the money the insurance company handles and 100% of the money the product/service provider charges is paid by the insured/patient since the insured/patient is the only one injecting money into the formula and the only one consuming the product/service.

Please take special note of the last three facts. Read them carefully. Sometimes we can be confused by “benefits” we receive from our employer. But all benefits an employer pays to an employee are simply wages and if the employer paid zero in insurance benefits the market in labor would drive them to pay that same amount in some other form. So all benefits are wages including matching insurance payments.

The above 10 facts should be beyond dispute and rather obvious to the casual observer. What may not be quite as obvious is the fact that the government interferes on a myriad of levels, distorting the prices at each phase of this process. And since so many layers of costs are hidden by the confusion provided by the insurance company, the employer and the government, the insured/patient never knows how much they are ultimately paying for the product/service. Therefore the product/service costs far more than the insured/patient would be willing to pay if they actually knew the real price.

At this point in the conversation a fallacy needs to be exposed and dealt with. Rather than laying out a 4000 word essay on price determination, or insisting my reader spend a few hours reading Man Economy and State by Murray Rothbard, I shall say outright that the price of anything in the market is based squarely on what the consumer is willing to pay. It has nothing to do with the cost of the good or service. As a matter of fact, the cost is determined by the price, not the other way around. Unless you’re familiar with Austrian Economics this may sound backwards to you because socialist economists have spent the last 120 years teaching the public to think backwards. But the fact remains that if the market supplies anything at a price the consumer judges to be too high that product/service will not be purchased and the seller will lower the price or go out of business. If the cost of production and distribution are so high that the seller cannot provide a price the consumer will pay, the market will force innovation or invention and drive the cost down to a consumer pleasing level.

Therefore the price of healthcare is determined by what the consumer is willing to pay, not what the healthcare costs the industry to provide. The only way to get a higher price from the consumer than they are willing to pay is to deceive the consumer by hiding part of the price!

Think about an automobile purchase. You go in and talk to the dealer. You find the car you want and agree to a price. When the smoke and mirrors all fade away and its time to write the check, how often is the check written for the same amount as the original price you agreed? Somehow the slick sales person has convinced you of a different price than you agreed to in the beginning. Now imagine if that same car purchase were arranged through an agreement between your employer, an insurance company, and a car dealer while heavily regulated and controlled by several agencies of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Transportation, and the FTC. Don’t you think they would all find ways to hide some of the price and take some of the plunder for themselves?

So then we are driven to a set of conclusions:

  1. The price of healthcare is far higher than the consumer can determine because the employer/insurance company relationship and the government hide a large portion of the price.
  2. The cost of providing healthcare is far higher than it would otherwise be because of the abundance of personnel required by the employer, the insurance company, various government agencies, and the personnel the healthcare provider needs to deal with each of these players.
  3. 100% of the price (both hidden and not hidden) of healthcare is paid by the consumer.
  4. No matter any other factors listed above, the price of healthcare will not and can not exceed what the patient is willing to pay unless part of the price is hidden.

Now for the unsettling part of this article.
When contemplating the price of healthcare, the average consumer will not consider the months and years they pay for health insurance without using it. Neither will they consider the portion of their insurance costs that their employer pays on their behalf. They will look at their pay stub or their pay records and they will imagine no more than a month or two of insurance premiums along with the actual out of pocket amount they will pay to the healthcare provider and the cost of losing a day’s pay to go to the doctor. Lets call this amount the “true price” because it is the price as the consumer sees it. This true price is the actual price the consumer would be willing to pay if not for the price distortions. Now brace yourself. This true price is what the healthcare provider would charge if not for the market distortions! (Remember Rothbard was mentioned above.)

Real life examples:
(Names changed and amounts rounded off but otherwise based on actual examples)

Mary is of an age that she must endure a particular health screening process. Her employer’s human relations representative tells her the procedure is covered under her insurance and she really needs to get it done.
Here is a breakdown of the complete price of the healthcare screening:

  • Two separate appointments requiring two half days missed from work – $200 (wages lost)
  • Co-pay and payments not covered by insurance – $350
  • Payment covered by the insurance company – $750
  • Payments made to the insurance company by Mary over the years (unseen) – indeterminable but vast
  • Cost of government intrusion into the healthcare market (unseen) – Far more than humanly imaginable

Now lets look at the price as Mary sees it:

  • Two separate appointments requiring two half days missed from work – $200
  • Actual out of pocket – $350
  • Deductions from pay for insurance for one month – $100

Total – $650
That’s it! $650 would be the fair market price for the screening if not for the market distortions!

Now let’s look at Mary’s daughter Jane who had an involuntary minor outpatient surgery.

  • One and one half days of work missed for the screening and the procedure and a weekend spent at home recovering – $300
  • Co-pay and payments not covered by insurance – $950
  • Deductions from pay for insurance for one month (seen by Jane) – $100
  • Payment covered by the insurance company (unseen) – $4750
  • Payments made to the insurance company by Jane over the years (unseen) – indeterminable but vast
  • Cost of government intrusion into the healthcare market (unseen) – Far more than humanly imaginable

The fair market price for Jane’s procedure without market distortions: $1350

In the long run, vast amounts of unseen money is taken from Jane and Mary and goes to support a bloated government bureaucracy, an entire insurance industry that exists purely because of government intervention in the market, and a wasteful inefficient healthcare industry that expends more money in legal defense and public image management than medical research or actual medical care giving.

The impressive facility where the real life Jane and Mary had their examinations and procedures includes a rotunda and a multi-story indoor atrium featuring a grand piano, a waterfall, and contemporary art throughout the building. The parking lot has attendants that prowl the lot in vehicles like you might see at an airport, offering rides up to the entrance where a doorman greets you and offers his services to get you to your appointment. As you pass the doorman, another attendant awaits with further offers of assistance. As you move through an architectural dream only slightly less opulent than the Palace of Versailles, gazing out through walls of glass at the manicured landscape, its hard not to wonder what a CT scan machine costs compared to the cost of keeping all those windows crystal clear.

Perhaps a free market would provide funding for such outlandish medical complexes, but I would be just as likely to believe that a free market would provide drive-up services for most doctor appointments and basic in-home nursing in 30-minutes or less with a simple phone call. And medical insurance would focus more on the big expenses and long term care and less on robbing you and your employer for year’s worth of payments.

 

Ben StoneBen
2011

Posted in Economics, Free Society, Health | Tagged , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Dangers of Over-Zealous Libertarianism

The Dangers of Over-Zealous Libertarianism
by Ian Lucas Hull

In your effort to progress into a truly free society, keep in mind that the principle of freedom includes the freedom to not have freedom. This is true concerning many things, but it is manifested the most in contract law, religion, and culture.

A contract is a mutual agreement in terms of service or provision and it entails a commitment to honor your end of the deal. Every contract will come with provisions making one person sacrifice certain personal wants or needs in an effort to supply the other person with their wants or needs. For instance, a marriage contract (outside of State interference) usually includes a line such as “till death do us part”. This means that although one party in the marriage may feel strongly urged to abandon their contract just because their partner is now in a coma (thus reducing their enjoyment of life), the commitment until death (a very explicit word) binds them to uphold their end of the agreement.

By an individual adopting a certain religion (also applicable to philosophy), the person is implying that they agree with what is being taught by the people they are following. At times, a religion/philosophy will have a hierarchy of leadership that the individual is asked to abide by, do the bidding of, or simply respect or love. This, too, is an example of exercising the freedom to not have certain other freedoms. Of course, at any time, provided a contract was not signed saying otherwise, an individual can freely leave their religion or philosophy of choice and adopt a new one. Religion and philosophy are NOT, contrary to conventional belief, violent authoritarian dictatorships by nature, and any religion or philosophy exhibiting those traits for whatever reason would be subject to justice as per the non-aggression principle of a free society.

Extremely similar to religion, culture is naturally hierarchical and it asks much of people that voluntarily adopt it. Culture may ask an individual to abstain from eating certain foods, or engaging in certain non-violent practices (like cutting your hair or dressing a certain way), or it can ask you to submit to certain authorities (like elders, intellectuals, workers, etc), or it may even ask you to abandon your property in profound ways (including your body). As with religion/philosophy, culture is not inherently violent or dictatorial; it’s merely a way of constructing priorities of life based on certain principles.

The issue I take with many libertarians is that so often the right of the individual to forsake their own freedom for something they consider more valuable is condemned and attacked. We see this especially with religion, but even with contracts and culture as well. At times, these attacks are manifested in libertine suggestions, such as the abandonment of the “institution” of marriage and to adopt universal open relationships for all humans; other times they take on a violent nature of their own by suggesting that ALL religion and culture be banned, thus removing the freedom of individuals to actually choose ANY way of life beyond the non-aggression principle. Regardless of how they’re conveyed, these attacks against personal choices in faith, institution, culture, and commitment should not be tolerated any more than the State and its practices of violent coercion. Rather, the principled approach to all those things would be to look at the engagements of individuals as they interact with others through the lens of voluntary interaction. This means that we should look at the relationships and commitments that a person is making with another and see if there was violent coercion resulting in involuntary action on the part of the victim; i.e. Was someone threatened with force to join a cause, or adopt a creed, or commit their lives to another? Only through this practical application are we able to decide whether or not the choices of someone are compatible with the tenets of libertarianism.

Ian Lucas Hull
2011

Posted in Bad Quaker Theology, Brief Articles and Short Notes, Free Society, The Campfire, Voluntaryism and Law, Voluntaryism and Social Interactions, Voluntaryism and the Zero Aggression Principle | Tagged , , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Dangers of Over-Zealous Libertarianism

Special Edition 1 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast

Special Edition 1 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast
by Ben Stone

News Rant Special Edition for Friday, May 27, 2011
Featured in this News Rant:

  • Black Market Tattoos in Jr High School Bathroom!
  • People who talk to reporters!
  • Reporting hype and using fear to drive viewership!
  • Using obvious statements to give legitimacy to questionable news
  • Link to original ABC13EYEWITNESS NEWS story (link may not be maintained)

Special Edition 1 Bad Quaker News Rant

Posted in All Podcasts, Audio Articles, Bad Quaker Fun, Economics, Free Society, Health, Property, The Campfire, Voluntaryism and Law, Voluntaryism and Social Interactions, Voluntaryism and the Zero Aggression Principle | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Special Edition 1 Bad Quaker Dot Com Podcast